Despite their wide implications on Turkey's domestic and foreign politics because of meir long stay, the deployment of these forces in Turkey has not been discussed much enough, except for the debates in TGNA at the time of the extension of meir stay. Even they have not been extensive and intensive. Some sections of the Turkish society have criticised their role in Turkey and in the region. But all these criticisms remained as temporal reactions, and evaporaled af ter the extension by TGNA.2
The views about their presence in Turkey can be clustered into two extreme groups. Some questioned their role in Turkeyand the region in general. They disputed the objective of the OPC forces in Turkey due to their alleged abuse of Turkey's national interests. In their opinion, the OPC forces were helping the Kurds to set up a Kurdish state in the region, and thus threatening Turkey's national and terriıorial integrity. They .also argued that in order to achieve this objective' the forces were giving logistic and .Head of International Relations Department of Kırıkkale University. lforeign Minister Sefa Giray's statement, Milliyet. 13 July 1991; and Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz's statement, Milliyet, 19 July 1991; and Cumhurıyet.
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intelligence suPPort to the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). Therefore, they demanded their removal from Turkey soooor than later. . .
. on the other hand, others who supported their presenee in Turkey argued that it was consistent with Turkey's national interests because of two reasons. First1y, due to their presence in ıncirlik, Turkey was able to influence United State's [US] decisions towards Turkey's fight against PKK terrorism . .In other words, they contended, the US had supported Turkish policy against the PKK. As an evidence it was shown that the US was not critical of Turkey's "Steel Operation" in northem Iraq in March-April 1995. Secondly, they argued that if they wereremoved from Turkey, the Westem countries could deploy them in an alternative place in the region. Then Turkey would have. bigger problem s because it would lose its leverage over the US decisions conceming the movement of the forees in northem Iraq.
lt is ironic that there has not been consistency in the views of the protagonists in TGNA. During the debates in TGNA, every time the government's request to extend their stay in Turkey was accepted by a majority of the deputies of the ruling parties in TGNA. For example, deputies of Anavatan Party [ANAP], who had initially voted for the ir deployment, later voted against the extension of their StaYin Turkey af ter it was relegated to the role of opposition. On the other hand, deputies of Soeial Demoerat Party (SHP), now Republican Populist Party (CHP), who had opposed the ir deployment in Turkey in 1991, later voted in favour of their longer stay. These contradictory attitudes compound the ambiguitiesin the objective(s) of the OPC forces in Turkey.
As a result, there is a fundamental question as to whether the OPC forees have lo st their original objective and whether their role has now been eroded af ter several changes in the global system, the regional politics, and in the countries concemed. To elarify the issue of the presence of the OPC forces in Turkey, this .artiele will first look at the origins of Operation Provide Comfort, including its legality; and then its stated and actual objective{s).
ORIGINS OF OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
The Westem idea of deploying a multinational force in Turkey is not new. Its intellectual origins can be traced back to the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. When the revolution in Iran caused serious turmoil in the Middle East, particularly in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, the Carter administration declared that the US would protect its "vital interests" in the Persian Gulf if necessary by force. Subsequently, the US administration, especially Defence Secretary Alexander Haig put forward the idea of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in order to protect US's "vital intereslS" in the region. RDF, masterminded by American strategist Albert Wholstetter, was mainly to protect the oif-rich sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf from any hostile groups or states in the region.3 However, .the idea could not be realized during the 1980s due to some disagreements -----l among NA TO's European members, including Turkeyand the USA, on NATO's oot-ofarea operations. 4 Furthermore, the deployment of such forces in Turkey would have been objected by the ex-Soviet Union and pro-Soviet countries and groups in the region. Yet, at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the idea was stili un<ler consideration. It was reported that the deployment in southeastem Turkey of a rapid deployment force had been conceived during the negotiations to sign the Conventional Forces in Europe (the CFE) Treaty.S The objective of NATO's great powers was to fortify the region agaiost unexpected instabilities, and to proteet European and American interests in the Middle East, like in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
The recent history of the deployment of the multinational force in Turkey can however be tmced back to the latest Gulf war and ensuing developments in the region. From this point of view it is a by-product of the 1990-1991 Gulf war. Itcame into being af ter the refugee crisis at the end of the Gulf war between Iraq and the Gulf Coalition countries. Arter the end of the Iran-Iraq war in August i988, it was discovered by the West that their actual enemy was not only Iran, but Iraq for two reasons: af ter the war, Iraq was left with an enormous military machine which had been supplied by the Westem powers during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Worse, Iraq was now trying to improve its military arsenal with the acquisition of nuclear, chemical and biplogical weapons. Indeed, this was a much more serious problem than Iraq having conventionaı weapons. The second problem which was c10sely connected with the rırst one was that Iraq had been pursuing an aggressive and revisionist foreign policy in the region. This fact was clearly proved by its invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Questions such as "why did Iraq invade Kuwait 1" and "would she invade another country in the region 1" will not be arialyzed here. 6 However, it was c1earthat Iraq would remain in Kuwait if there was no opposition from the great powers' This position was a serious blow to the status quo in the region which would not be tolerared by regional and external countries.
The objectives laid down in the U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq were mostly achieved af ter the Gulf war: Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was ended and Kuwait's territofial integrity was restored. Iraq's military power and weapons were largely destroyed. At the end of the war, UN Security Council adopted Resolution 686 to cease the war and Resolution 687 to oblige Iraq withseveraı responsibilities. The Iatter asked Iraq to "unconditionally accept the destruction, remova1, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; all ballistk missiles with a range greater than iSO kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities." Resolution 687 also asked Iraq "to submit to the Secretary-General ...a declaration of the locatioos, amounts and types of all items specifıed [above] The most seriaus repercussion of the Gulf war was of course Baghdad's declining power and authority within its own counıry. Now iraq was incapable of keeping lawand order, especially in its northem and southem parts. This weakness was an opportunily for the anti-regime groups inside Iraq such as the Shias and me Kurds and for those countries which had imperialist ob~tives in Iraq.
Aware of Iraq's complex social struebıre and the magnitude of the dissidents in Iraq, the then US President Bush ha,d called on, during the Gulf war, the lraqi dissident groups."to lake matters into their owo hands to f~Saddam Hussein, the dictalOr, to step aside ...,,8 lt was evident that the US President did not wish to put himself and his army into risk to disrupt Saddam Hussein regime but left it to the iraqi groups inside Iraq. Soon after the Gulf war, the Shias in the south and the Kurds in the north revolted against Saddam Hussein's authorily in Baghdad. The uprisings in March 1991 brought Iraq to the brink of total collapse and overthrow of Saddam's governmeoL As the Shias in southem iraq gained towns, Iranian leaders expressed their support to the rebels, and called on Saddam Hussein " [to] yield to the people's will, and step dowo".9 '
However, Saddam Hussein had still possessed enough military power to be able to cıash these uprisings. Iraq's anny had been defeated. but not destroyed altogether. And this remaining anny cıashed therevolting Shias in the south and the Kurds in the north. This resulted in a massive exodus towards the neighbouring countries, Turkeyand Iran. Tuıkish-Iraqi border turned to a big "tent cily" wim half a million refugees.
The US President a1so failed to come ıo the help of the lraqi gmups against Baghdad's use of mmtary power. Instead, it was announced on 27 March, 1991 that it had made "no promise to the Shias and Kurds", adding that "the American people had no stomach for a military operation ıo dictate the outeome of a political struggle in lraq."IO Thus US military forces around Iraq did not shoot Iraq's helicopters which were shooting the Shias and the Kurds. i 1 The US was apparently concerned by the polential Iranian influeoce over the Shia gmups in Iraq.
From Turkey's perspective, the problem was different. In the wake of this instability in its border and its apparent economic, social, and even political implications for Turkey, the then Turkish President Turgut Özal asked the Gulf Coalition aIlies, particularly the US, to help Turkey cope with the refugees problem. özaı, who was under the pressure of the refugee crisis after the 1988 Khalabca massacre in Iraq, proposed to set fonnation or deployment of any militMy forces inside or outside Iraq. It condemns Iraq's repression of the civilian people, and "appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organisations to contribute to [the] humanitarian relief efforts." But this "contribution" does not mean a deployment of militMy forces inside or around Iraq. Besides, there was no consensus among the Seeurity Council members on the type of the contributions: the idea to create a "security zone" in northem Iraq was rejected by the Soviet Union, China and Iraq. Despite these objeetions, the US, France, the United Kingdom, ıtalyand the Netherlands went on deploying the ÜPC i forees inside Iraq in May'1991. 13 Hence if the issue had been brought to the UN Seeurity Council for approvaı, it would have been vetoed by the ex-Soviet Union and China.
The deployment in Turkeyand activities in Iraq of ÜPC II a1so contravenes not only Article 2, paragraphs 4 and 7, of the UN Charter, but a1so UN Seeurity Council Resolution 688 itself because of its violation of Iraq's sovereignty over its southem and northem parts. Sinee the beginning of the debacle in 1991, iraq has been unable to exert its power in the area above the 36th parallel and below the 32th parallel. Iraq's territory has been de faeıo divided into three regions, curbing Baghdad's' sovereignty inside its own countey. These demarcations were unilaterally declared by the United States, Franee and the United Kingdom, whose deeision had been based on their own interpretation of Resolution 688. With this interpretation of Resolution 688, they sent troops to northern Iraq for the protection of "safe havens" to provide supplies to :Kurdish refugees. 14 Although UN Seeurity Council Resolution 688 asks the member countries and the humanitarian organisations to "contribute tO...humanitarian relief efforts", 15 the Resolution does not ask the member countricl: to Oy over northem Iraq because this' would be against the wording of the same Resolution saying that: "reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in the area." Not surprisingly, iraq has objeeted to the activities of üPC II, viewing it as an intervention in its internal affairs, and violation of its sovereignty. Under these circumstances, according to the UN Charter, these forces cannot be sent to Iraq. Regardless of the fact thal Baghdad had repressed its people in the north and the south, this usurpation from Baghdad of sovereignty is not compatible with the UN principles. This is a1so in contradiction with the basic principle of international law, that is the non-intervention in states' internal affairs.
Some argued that forhumanitarian purposes, intervention can be made against iIIegitimate regimes and against criminal actions. 16 But this kind of interpretation of international law may create arbitrary actions in international politics. There are no world-w ide rules and principles, nor consensus, on "what are the human rights ?", "on which conditions human rights are deemed to be violated 1", and "which are the iIIegitimate regimes and criminal actions 1" The difficulty in answering these questions often leads to double-standard behaviours in international politics. Those Western poweıs who intervened in lraq's internal affairs by launching OPC i and II were not so sensitive and active for more than three years to much worse human rights violations in Bosnia. They did not even consider to C{e3Iean 'operation provide comfon force' to prevent the Serbian massacre of Bosnian people. On the contrary, and in contradiction to the arguments for intervention, the UN Security Council members argued for a long time that the war in Bosnia was a civil war, which was not amatter for extemal powers. 1be contradiction between the West's quick intervention to proteet the Kurds within iraq and the West's slowness to protect the Bosnians within Bosnia-Herzegovina can be explained only by their conreption of national interests and objec~ves in the two cases.
. Nor was its deployment in Turkey based on any of the UN Seeurity Council resolutions on Iraq. It had not been approved by the ex-Soviet Union, then a member of the Seeurity CounciL. 17 The transfer of OPC i air forces from zaho to ıncirlik was deeided by the US on June 25, 1991,18 contingent upon Turkey's approvaı. 1ben the negotiations began. During his visit to Ankara in early July, US Defence Undeısecretary Paul Wolfowitz hoped that the forces would be deployed in Turkey.19 lt did not last long to reach an agreement on the deployment of the forces in Turkey.20 The Turkish govemment approved the deployment of OPC II in Turkey. And this was done without an assent from TGNA, but with a govemment deeision which was based on TGNA Legislation 126 dated January 17, 1991. But this a1so needs a criticaı anaIysis as to whether it is constitutionally legal.
Thus, the second perspective of the legality question is the Turkish Constitution. To make its deeision constitutionally right, the Mesut Yılmaz govemment based their deployment in Turkey on TGNA Legislation 126. 21 On this basis, the govemment decided by a decree on July 18, 1991 to deploy the forces in Turkey.
However, Legislation 126, which was adopted on January 17, 1991, that was the day to start the Gulf war against Iraq, cannot be a legal basis for the deployment of the OPC forces in Turkey. Legislation 126 had given mandate to the Akbulut government Lo "dispateh Turkish Anned Forces abroad and to station and use foreign armed forecs in Turkish territory".22 This mandale was given in order Losupport UN Seeurity Council Resolution 678 "to use all necessary means against Iraq". In other words, this was granted to the Turkish govemment at the critical time of war against Iraq, and as a preparation for an unexpected auaek from Iraq. on this basis, NATO ait forces in ıncirlik 17Mllllyet. But the refugee crisis, which started af ter the end of the Gulf war, was dealt with by Resolulion 688 long af ter the war. Therefore Legislalion 126 cannot be a background for the deployment of the OPC II forces arid for the foUowing legislalions. For the raison d'eıre of their deployment in Turkey is not the Gulf war, but the refugee crisis after the end of the Gulf war. Otherwise, this connection would mean that Turkey has been preserving the war condilions against Iraq .. Indeed, according Lo some international Iawyeis, this meant the conlinualion of the declaralion by Turkey of war against 1raq.23 . But this is not thecase because after the liberalion of Kuwait from Iraq's oecupation, the war is over. The developments after the cease-fm~agreement on February 28 consıitute a new situation whose legal bases can be found only in UN Security Council Resolulion 688, which, as menlioned above, makes no request for such fon:es.
Subsequently, the Mesut Yılmaz government made two mare decisions conceming the presence of the OPC ii fon:es in Turkey: in September 199110 extend their stay for another three months; and in December 199110 extend it for anather six months. These decisions were a1so made without anyassent from TONA. Therefore the implementalion The third perspective on the Iegality question is the NATO context NATO ofTlCials stated that the objective of the presence of the OPC II forces in Turkey was to prorect the Kurds, and this was not one of the responsibililies of the NATO A11iance.26 Since the Middle East region isan 'out-of-area' it cannot be concerned with the problems in the region. This was conceded by the US representalives. As Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams said the forces were not under NATO command.27 Furthermore, Germany, tough a member of NA TO, is not a part of the OPC II. Furthermore it has a1waysbeen respectively. 26Cumburlyet. 13 July 1991. 27Mllllyet. 14 July 1991. against the use of its arms and troops' outside NA TO context. Its auempts LO impose military sanctions on Turkey stemmed from its allegations that German weapons were being used in out-of-area operations, and against the Kurdish people in the area. Besides, France, though outside the military wing of the" NA TO Alliance, is one of OPC II countries. Moreover, in its leııer to the participant countries-the USA, the UK, France, the' Dutch, Belgium and ltaly-, the Turkish govemment declared at that time that Turkey would allow the use of bases in İncirlik and Batman for non-NATO objectives. 28
The argument that NATO can support Turkey against threats which may come from the 'out-of-area' of the NATO Alliance, that is from the Middle East. is a considerable olle. According to the argument. Turkey have deployed the OPC II forces in Turkeyasa deterrence to threats from Iraq. But even this is not a strong basis: There are differences of opinion between Turkeyand its NATO allies on the source Qf threat and threat perception. For example, Turkey views PKK terrorism as a threat to its national and territorial integrity. It has been fighting against this threat for more than a decade. But on this issue, the NATO Allies, particularly Germany, have düferent considerations. Some of them view Turkey's fight against the PKK as aviolation of human rights and demoeratic principles and so on. As a result, OPC II operations in northem iraq may not be serving Turkey's struggle against PKK terrorism.
Finally, as far as the Turkish-US strategic relationship is concemed, it may be argued that it is based on the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (the DECA) signed between Turkeyand the 'uS in 1980. But this argument is also without any foundation because the DECA is also made within the NATO contexL Consequently only basis for thedeployment of these forces in Turkey is a political consensus betweenTurkey and the US, the UK and France. In the view of these weaknesses in its legality, it can beargued that OPC II represents a new situation in Turkey's relations with the West af ter the Gulf war and af ter the end of the Cold War. This, new situation can be called as 'Eurasian Security Consensus' between Turkeyand the West. That is concemed with the new challenges in the three regions: the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Middle East and the North Africa, and the Balkans. The new situation in Turkish-Westemrelations is not based on the old legal foundations. There is no new legal basis either. OPC II which is closely tied to the post-cold war developments is waiting for a new legality. And the longer stay, or removal, of the OPC II forces is closely tied to the objectives of Turkey, the US and other Western countries, and LO their expectations from OPC II to achieve their objectives. In other words, participant countries have different objectives and expectations from OPC II. The ambiguity in the successiye extensions of the stay of the OPC II forces in Turkey can be Iightened by an analysis of the objectives of the partidpant countries in the lig ht of changes particolarly in the region since their first deployment in 1991.
REPERCUSSIONS OF OPC II
The main objective of OPC II was stated to be a deterrent force so as to prevent However, their quest for an independent state is opposed by the regional countries in particutar. Turkey, Iran and Syria declared their opposition to a Kurdish state in the region, and their policy to maintain Iraq's territorial integrity.29 Turkey time and again intervened both militarlly and politically in the developments in northern Iraq. In the view of Turkey's interventions and economic sanctions on Iraq, the Kurdish gmups in the north understood that they were dependent on Turkey for the flow of food, medicine, and other essentials. In other words, they carne to realize that Turkey was a life-line for them.
In addition, Turkey, which has close eye on the developments in the area, tried hard to block any support to the Kurds from outside, be they govemments or nongovernmental organizations, and to manipulate the relations between the Kurdish gmups in the area, and to unite them against the PKK. In the wake. of Turkey's heavy engagement with the region, Talabani became convinced that they could bardly set up an independent state in northem Iraq. He said that this was not somethingthat could come about without the support of Turkey, Iran and Syria. He said if these three countries closed their borders to an independent Kurdistan, such a state could not survive. He returned back to the beginning: "We are struggling to establish a united, democratic, pluralist, parliamentary and federated Iraq. We are not separatist We are the Iraqi Kurdistan democratic movement "30 He implif',d that they wouJd eventually restore relations with Baghdad. But this is an ambiguous stance, indeed, produced partly by the encouragement given by the Westem countries and partly by the presence of the OPC II forces in Turkey. Thus the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by Mesud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led Jelal Talabani do not have a clear and explicit objective and a consistent policy about the future of northem Iraq.
As a result, a power vacuum emerged in northem Iraq above the 36th parallel, which is regularly monitored by the OPC II aircrafts. The controlover Iraq created new problem s both in northem Iraq and in Turkey. As a result of restrictions on Iraq's sovereignty, the regional status quo ante was eroded. The condilions in Turkeyand Iraq changed so much that the pre-Gulf war period could never be seen again. .' This contlict not only prolonged the power vacuum in the region for an unforeseeable future, but also generated an opportunity for the PKK LOhave shelter in the authority vacuum. The PKK, having found a place in the power vacuum, Iaunched more auacks against the Turkish territory. As a result, the PKK terrorlsm sharply increased tensions in the area.3 3 The daily killings in southeastem Turkey reached LOthe point of a guerilla war between the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK terrorists. This war cost Turkey much, with 7 billion dollars spent for the war in 1994, apart from a great number of losses of people.
'.
• OPC II a1so overshadowed Turkish-Iraqi relations. Before the Gulf war, these two countnes used to cooperate against the Kurdish guerilla groups in both countries. 34 But af ter the war, while Turkey deployed the OPC II forces in ıncirlik, giying the control of the area to the multinational force, Iraq was put under control of the UK and the US. Since then Turkish-Iraqi relations have been cut off. The most important aspect of this has been the closure of the oil pipelines for six years. During this period, there were some auempts by both side to resume the flow of oil through the oil~ipelines, but this was not possible due to the UN Securily Council resolutions on Iraq. 5 Another aspect of the deteriorating Turkish-Iraqi relations is the Turkish foreign policy IOwards the northem Iraqi problem. There seems a "contradiction" inTurkey's objectives IOwards the problem of northern lraq.36 Turkey established relatiOlls with Barzani and Talabani in an auempt to collaboraıe them against the PKK in northem Iraq. But Turkey's rapprochement to the Kurds was objected by Iraq because it was seen as an "intent on violating Iraqi sovereignty. In the wake of the above problem s, it can be concluded that the presence in Turkey of the OPC iiforces created unexpected, mostly negative, consequences for Turkey, thus creating misgivings over its original objectives. Did it now become an instrument for both the Westem countries and Turkey to achieve their wider objectives in the post-cold war era ? Particular attention should be paid to the interests of the US and Turkey. The following discussion will dwell on the objectives of the US and Turkey in maintaining these forces in Turkey. In other words, it will exarnine how useful it is for national objectives of the participant countries concerned.
OPC n as an Instrument for US's Other Objectives ?
There is Iittle doubt that the US has several interests in the Middle East, ranging from having free access to the oil resources of the region to supporting pro-American groups and states in the region. The discussion of these interests is not a subject of this study. However, there are some specific developments in the area in relation to OPC II. These developments encourage us to ask how the US enhances its gains from these developments by maintaining the OPC ii forces in Turkey
As a resuIt of enormous changes since its deployment iiı Turkey, some observers questioned the stated role of OPC II, and argued that it was an instrument for the US's undeclared policy to set up a Kurdish state in the region. Former Turkish Ambassador Şükrü Elekda~argued that it contributed to the emergence of the nucleus of a Kurdish state. Thus it was against Turkey's national interests to koop these forces intncirlik:. on the contrary, he argued, Turkey's interest as weıı as Iraq's, would require its removal from Turkeyand restoration ofTurkish-lraqi relations. 39 U~ur Mumcu argued that the main reason for the rise of the PKK in Turkeyand in the West was the presence of OPC 11. 40 He aISOassened that the main objective of OPC ii was to set up a federal Kurdish state, and then to protect this state. He concluded that this was to activate Article 64 of the Serves Treaty. Mumcu predicted that by manipulating the Kurdish.groups in the region the West would wish to control the rich oil fields of Mosul, Kirleok and Sulemania in Iraq:~l Former Turkish President Kenan Evren went further, and argued that OPC II, which was claimed tO have protected the Kurds in northem Iraq, might also atıempt to protect the Kurds in southeastem Turkey. Alternatively, the Kurdish people in Turkey might ask the forces to protect them, leading LO its intervention to Turkey's domestic problems. Evren also implied that the forces might deteriorate Turkey's aıready problematic relations with its neighbours. 42
On the alleged US support to the separatist groups in the region-the KDP, the PUK, and the PKK-, İsmail Cem argued that OPC II generated a large operational area for the separatists in northem Iraq. This helped them to increase their attacks to Turkey. Thus, Cem argued, Turkey was making its foreign policy towards Iraq in line with the 39şükrO Elekda~. "GUneydo~uda Düşük Duzeyli Savaş", MIlliyet. At this point it must be pointed out that there is a methodological problem in.the above claims. These views reify theUnited States as a single body.Yet, reification of states as such may produce misleading evaluations and conclusions on the foreign policy of a countey. A state's foreign policy is made by a combination of forces inside the countey, and each of which may have different consideradans. The US foreign policy is made by the US administratian, but greatly influenced by other interests in the United States. To ascertain a country's foreign policy, one has Lo make distinction between its foreign policy decisions and actions.
When evaiuating the US foreign policy, one must carefully analyze its decisians and actions IOwards nonhem Iraq. When looked at the US decisions and actions, there is no clear evidence that the US administratian looks for a Kurdish state in the region. 11ıat does not overlook the fact that there may be same interest groups in the United States andeven ",ithin the US administratian who may have sympathy for a Kurdish state. Bul their views do not appear prevalent on the US foreign policy IOwards northem Iraq. The evidence for this argument can be found in US's decisions and actions regarding the Kurdish state.
As far as the US decisions were concemed, the above claims were repeatedly denied by the US officials at various levels. US Secretaey of Stilte Undersecretary Strobe Talhot. for example, reiterated that the US did not look for a Kurdish state in the region. but was . keen to protect the Kurdish people in nonhem Iraq. Thus it was no secret that the US was in close touch with the PUK and the KDP of Iraq. But Talbot argued that white the US administratian viewed the PKK as a terrarist organisation, it believed that onlythe Iraqi Kurds could prevent PKK's growth in iraq and its infıltration into Turkey. Theı'efore the US auempted to play a middleman role to cease fıre between the Kurdish groups in Iraq.47
As for the US actions in the region. the US administration did not denounce Turkey's militaey operations in northem Iraq. For instance, in Turkey's militaey operation in northem Iraq in April 1995, called "Steel Operation", the US administratian 'understood' Turkey's woiTies about the PKK terrorism and its operation. unlike. for i 43ısmail Cem. "Güneydoğugerçekten 'yerinde' duruyor mu 7", S~bab. Then in the view of its support to Turkey's military operations, lhe US's objective has not been to protect lhe Kurds, nor to divide Iraq. But its main objective is to control two countries in the region within lhecontext of its policy of "dual containmenl." In olher words, OPC II couldbe seen as an instrumem of US foreign policy to contain Iraq and lran. 49 Connected to lhe Dual Containmem policy is lhe "Defence Counter-Proliferation
Initiative" of the Clinton administration. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is seen as lhe most pressing long-mn issue in internationalseeurity for lhe US because lhese weapons can be lhe great equalizers of international relations. Due to its great importance for lhe US, it is seen as one of seven 'categories for lhe possible use of force by the US.50 In olher words, lhe US can use force to ensure lhat nudear weapons are not possessed by lhe "backlash states."
. ' ,
It is difficuh to predict whelher and, if ever how, OPC II forces can be used against Iran. But US administration's declaration of economic sanctions against Iran can be seen as a step in lhe containment of lhis country wilhin lhe context of lhe dual containment policy. And there can be several rea,sons for lhe containmem of Iran, which is beyond the scope of this article. 5 i But it must be pointed out that the US administration pursues a policy to contain Iran's intluence in lhe Gulf region.
The seeonqcountry in lhe "dual containment" policy is indeed Iraq which is now encirded from lhe soulh and lhe norili. As far as lhe norili is concerned, lhere can be shown direct and indirect factors in lhe containment of Iraq. While OPC II has acted as a direct military and political threat against Iraq, the KDP and lhe PUK in northem Iraq have played an indirect role, acting as a 'fiflh column' against Baghdad's aulhority. The US administration asked these group s not to establish' relations wilh Baghdad, but to unite among lhemselves. And the objective was to diseipline Saddam Hussein's regime to The second requirement is Louse constant pressure over Iraq, so that it yields to US-UK pressures. The US and the UK are adamant that iraq be fully disarmed as was stated by UN Seeurity Council Resolution 687. As long as this process continoes, the problem of Iraq is bound to prnlong. The removal of the sanctions and the restoration of Iraq's fuıı sovereignty are closely tied to Baghdad's dismantling of its nucIear, biological and chemical weapons, and ballistic missiles programs as weD as LoBaghdad's acceptance of a long-term monitoring regime over its territory.S3 Thus Iraq's deelaration in December 199410 recognize Kuwait's territorial integrily was not seen enough to lift the sanctions. S4 The UN Seeurily Council Specia1 Commission on Iraq maintained that there were some more works to destroy Iraq's weapons. Ambassador Madeleine Albright of the US and Britain's Sir David Hannay both ıold that "Iraq stiD had a long way to go Lo fuım its obligations. "SS on the question of permission to iraq for oil sa1e, there was a division in the UN Securily Council on the removal of the sanctions LoIraq. whereas the US and the UK were against the removal of sanctions on Iraq, other. veto members, Fıance, China, and Russia favoured gradual removal of the sanctions. S6 But iraq refused partial removal of the sanctions, deelining to accept the UN Securily Council decisions to a1low iraq tO SeD $2 biUion worth of oil under the UN inspection. iraq feared that it putlimitations on its sovereignty.S7 But af ter İong negotiations between the UN and Iraq, they sigoed an agreement Lo allow Iraq to seıı $2 billion worth of oil for the purc:hase of food and medicine. But this agreement gavc Iraq only a "conditiorial sovereignty." OPC II~also be seen as a supplementary force for the UN Seeurily Council Specia1 Commission which inspects Iraq's weapons, technology and potential military power. It was thos argued that OPC II may be used to strike Iraq's nuclear facilities Lo help the UN's inspection team. S8 lt was a1so reported that while the UN's inspection team were searching for nuclear weapons technology in Baghdad, the OPC n ailerafts made 40 sorties, and AW ACS deployed in Turkey made 7 reconnaissanee flights, over northcrn Iraq. 59 Turkey's Interests in OPC II
. The prime objective of Turkey is LO prevent the emergence of economic, social and political problem s, as resuhed from the refugee crisis in 1988 and 1991. Worse, a refugee crisis might have adverse effectsonTurkey's territorial integrity because of its political ramifications over the separatist groups in the area. Therefore, Turkey is keen to preserve the current borders, including Iraq's territorial integrity. A divided Iraq would be deteimental to Turkey's interests. Turkish foreign policy lOwards Iraq af ter the end of the Gulf war has been based on this objective. Turkey have pursued a policy both with its neighbours and with the Westem counteies to maintain Iraq's integrity. Turkey's multilateral diplomacy has aimed to prevent a Kurdish state out of a divided Iraq by exerting influence over the Westem world, i.e. the US, the UK and France. In the words of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, if Turkey expelled the forces, the Westem states might move thcm to altemative places such as Syria or Cyprus, or to northem Iraq. In this case, the possibility of establishing a Kurdish state in northem Iraq would increase. It was argued that the prescnce in Turkey of OPC II generated influence by Turkey on the Westem counteies' policies. Although it was a risky situation, it was stated, it was the best of all options Turkey had. 60 Connected LO this objective is the fight against thePKK terrorism both inside and outside Turkey, be it in northem Iraq or in Westem countries. Alongside the military operations against the PKK inside Turkey, Turkish military forees launched three major cross-border operations in northem Iraq since the end of the Gulf war. 61 Turkey's fight againsı the PKK would encounter bigger problems if Turkey removed OPC II from Turkey. Turkey had receivcd support from the US on these operations in return for Turkey'~support for US foreign policy in the region. 62
The presence in Turkey of OPC II could also be seen as an instrument to seeure US support for Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. 63 One of the critical issues in the Balkans for Turkish foreign policy is the Bosnian crisis. Erdal ınönü, the Deputy Prime Minister of the CoaHtion Govemment in 1992, argued that when Turkey demanded from the Westem countries to set up a multinational force to stop war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey's action to expel the OPC II forces would not be 59Cumhurlyet, 
CONCLUSIONS
There can be made four conclusions. Firstly, OPC II went beyond its original objective which was LOprolcct the people of northem Iraq. Its presence in Turkey created unexpected consequences, noı only for Turkey but also for the region as a whole. As a resull, its original objective hecame ambiguous. Secondly, it hashecome an instrument for the Westem countries LOachieve their objectives over Iraq, that is to keep controlover Iraq and the region. Thus its duraıion is ıied lO lraq's full disannament and to the changes in Iraq. Thirdly, it is also used as an inslrument by Turkey LOachieve its wider foreign policy objectives in other issues. From this perspective, tl)e presenee in Turkey of the OPC II forces is only a symbolic force for the Turkish government to receive US The question as, to how long OPC II forees will remain in Turkey depends on changes in Turkish domestic politics and in the Middle East politics, particularly in Iraq. it appears that the US will continue to contain Iraq as well as iran until these two countries, may be others as well, come to terms with the US policy. Turkey, too, is a player in this game of regional balanee of power. Turkey has been playing a~Westem role in the region against Iraq and Iran. And the presenee in Turkey of the OPC II forces is an aspect of this role.
.
Recently the DYP-ANAP coalition government proposed the US Administration to make some modifications on the operations of the OPC II forces. 
